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On June 21, 2004, the United States Supreme Court decided
the health law “case of the year” in the two consolidated cases of
Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila and CIGNA HealthCare of Texas, Inc. v.
1
Calad. The Court held that section 502(a) of the Employee
2
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) “completely preempt[s]” and thus invalidates the tort liability provisions of the
3
4
Texas Health Care Liability Act (THCLA).
The case could
potentially affect the rights of millions of Americans in a matter of
vital concern—whether they will receive the health insurance
coverage promised them if they become unable to pay for medical
bills out of their own resources. The Court justified its decision as
5
effecting “clear congressional intent.”
6
In reality, congressional intent was anything but clear. The
Court’s decision was inconsistent with long-established and logically
valid interpretations of procedural statutes, as well as the wording,
7
structure, and underlying policies of ERISA. The decision was also
inconsistent with constitutional principles that should inform all
jurisprudence. Instead, it was based on Supreme Court precedent
that the Court itself had already partially disavowed as “not [giving]
1. 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004) [hereinafter Davila/Calad].
2. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000). ERISA is codified as Chapter 18 of the
United States Labor Code, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-461 (2000).
3. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 88.001-.003 (Vernon 1997 & Supp.
2004).
4. Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2502.
5. At nine distinct places in the opinion, the Davila/Calad Court explicitly
said that it was reading congressional intent. See id. at 2491, 2495, 2498 n.4, 2499500, 2503. Five times the Court said that the intent was “clear” or that evidence of
intent was “strong.” See id. at 2491, 2495, 2497, 2498 n.4, 2500.
6. See infra Part III.B.4.
7. See infra Part III.
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much help [in] drawing the line.”
This article does not suggest that the Davila/Calad holding was
unexpected or completely incongruent with earlier Supreme Court
decisions. To the contrary, if the Court had decided the case
differently, it would have had to break with its own precedent. This
article argues that the Court should have done just that—that the
correct decision would have favored more fundamental
considerations than the mere desire to remain superficially
consistent with its previous holdings and rationales.
The Court missed an opportunity to correct what has been
9
called “an unjust and increasingly tangled ERISA regime.” This
case had huge national importance, and the issue deserved better
and more careful analysis than it was given by the Court.
I.

THE SETTING FOR THE CASE

A. ERISA
The purpose of ERISA is to broaden and strengthen the social
safety net by encouraging employers, primarily through federal
income tax preferences, to provide certain non-salary benefits to
10
employees. These benefits are intended to protect employees and
their families from impoverishment as a result of retirement,
illness, disability, or death. ERISA also requires those who provide
and administer the benefits to satisfy basic standards of equity
11
disclosure, integrity, and financial soundness.
Because the principal incentive to employers for the provision
of non-salary benefits is the reduction of income taxes, ERISA is
12
intimately correlated with the Internal Revenue Code.
The
Departments of Labor and Treasury are instructed to coordinate
8. N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins., 514
U.S. 645, 655 (1995) (discussing prior attempts to construe preemption by
ERISA).
9. Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2503 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting
DeFelice v. Aetna United States Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 453 (3d Cir. 2003)
(Becker, J. concurring)).
10. See Parker v. BankAmerica Corp., 50 F.3d 757, 765 (9th Cir. 1995)
(warding off economic hardship relating to joblessness and rewarding employees
for past service to companies); Altemose Constr. Co. v. Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 443 F. Supp. 492, 506 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (protecting the employees’ right to
receive benefits).
11. See ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).
12. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 401-20 (2000).
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13

their implementing rules and regulations.
Some employee
benefit arrangements qualify for favorable treatment as a result of
Congress’ desire to contribute to the social safety net. Other
arrangements are deemed less preferable and do not qualify for
favorable tax treatment.
The term “plan” is a key concept in ERISA. A “plan” is “any
plan, fund, or program . . . established or maintained by an
employer or by an employee organization [e.g., a union],” which
has the purpose of providing certain types of non-salary benefits for
14
employees. ERISA covers two types of plans: “pension plans” (also
called “employee pension benefit plans”) and “welfare plans” (also
called “employee welfare benefit plans”). Pension plans provide
retirement or post-employment income to employees. As the very
name Employee Retirement Income Security Act suggests, the
primary focus is on pension plans. ERISA imposes a variety of
substantive requirements of the statute upon pension plans relating
15
to participation, funding, and vesting. By contrast, ERISA “does
16
not regulate the substantive content of welfare plans.”
One type of welfare plan is a plan that provides “through the
purchase of insurance . . . medical, surgical, or hospital care or
17
benefits.” These medical plans are the principal subject of this
article.
B. Managed Care and Health Maintenance Organizations
For many years, national health care costs have risen
18
substantially faster than the rate of inflation. Although the causes
are numerous, one factor undoubtedly has been the third-party
payment system. The vast majority of health care costs are not paid
19
by the patients. Instead, the costs are typically paid by a thirdparty directly, such as a governmental entity or a health insurance
13. ERISA § 3004, 29 U.S.C. § 1204.
14. ERISA § 3(1)-(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)-(3).
15. ERISA §§ 201-308, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-86.
16. See Metro. Life Ins. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 732 (1985).
17. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
18. See Consumer Price Index: September 2004, NEWS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR NEWS
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, Washington D.C.) (Oct. 19, 2004), available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/cpi_10192004.pdf; see also JANET LUNDY
ET AL., TRENDS AND INDICATORS IN THE CHANGING HEALTH CARE MARKETPLACE, 2004
Update exhibit 1.3 (Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation 2004), available at
http://www.kff.org/insurance/7031/index.cfm.
19. See LUNDY, supra note 18, at exhibit 1.8.
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company. Thus, a patient receives the full benefits of the care but
pays only a portion of its cost. Arguably, this disassociation between
costs and benefits can lead to over utilization of medical services
20
and a misallocation of economic resources.
Care providers themselves could limit the provision of health
care services, but they too may operate under distorted incentives.
For example, a physician may be faced with a choice of two
medications to prescribe to a patient. One medication might be
slightly more efficacious but considerably more expensive than the
other. If the physician knows that the patient will be paying for the
medication out of his own pocket, he may give the patient a
detailed comparison of the two alternatives. On the other hand, if
the physician knows that a third-party will bear the entire cost, he
will have little reason to discuss the less expensive possibility.
In a variation of this situation, the patient and the physician
might be faced with a choice of medical treatments, and the
treatment decision could affect the physician’s own interests. For
example, an issue might arise as to whether the patient should
spend one or two days in the hospital following surgery. It might
be slightly preferable, medically, for the patient to spend two days
in the hospital, but the financial cost of the additional day could be
significant. If fully informed of the consequences, the patient, if
paying for the care himself, might reasonably elect to spend only
one day in the hospital after the surgery. However, if the patient
spends an extra day in the hospital, the physician will be paid for
that additional day of care. Ethically, the physician is bound to
21
advise the patient solely according to the patient’s welfare.
Nevertheless, physicians have human frailties and may consciously
or unconsciously steer the patient toward the alternative that best
suits the doctor’s personal interests. Such propensities may be
accentuated if the doctor understands that a third party, rather
than the patient, will pay for the hospitalization.
20. See Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Was Withdrawing Vioxx the ‘Right Thing to Do’?,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2004, at A17 (deciding whether to take one drug or medical
treatment over another may depend on whether a third party is paying).
21. See AM. MED. ASS’N, PRINCIPLES OF MED. ETHICS No. VIII, available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2512.html (last visited Mar. 1,
2005) (defining standards of conduct for honorable physician behavior including
“responsibility to the patient as paramount”); AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MED.
ETHICS
E-8.054,
E-10.015,
available
at
http://www/amaassn.org/ama/noindex/category/11760.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2005)
(regarding ethical conduct within the patient-physician relationship as to financial
incentives).
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As a remedy, the concept of managed care was developed in
the early 1970s. The American Medical Association (AMA) has
defined “managed care” as “those processes or techniques used by
any entity that delivers, administers, and/or assumes risks for
health care services in order to control or influence the quality,
accessibility, utilization, or costs and prices or outcomes of such
22
services provided to a defined enrollee population.”
One of the ideas behind managed care is that health care
providers and recipients should not make all decisions regarding
the provision of health care services. Third-party payers should also
23
Under the managed care scenario, health care
have a say.
decisions are to be guided by objective standards of medical
24
efficacy and cost. A managed care organization (MCO), which
may be the payer or act on behalf of the payer, will apply these
standards to specific situations to determine which procedures are
medically efficacious and cost-effective. Only procedures that meet
the criteria of efficacy and economy qualify for payment.
Furthermore, health care providers may be given economic
25
incentives to reduce cost in their treatment decisions.
Part of the savings from managed care comes from the
management of health care services, with a focus on costs as well as
medical efficacy. Another aspect of the savings—in many instances
more pronounced than savings from the actual care
management—comes from the economic influence MCOs can
exert over health care providers. MCOs contract with physicians,
hospitals, and other providers, under which those providers agree
to provide health care services to the beneficiaries of the MCOs at
22. AM. MED. ASS’N, HEALTH AND ETHICS POLICIES OF THE AM. MED. ASS’N
HOUSE
OF
DELEGATES
H-285.998,
available
at
http://www.amaassn.org/ama/noindex/category/ 11760.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
23. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Managed Care, at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/managed.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
24. AM. MED. ASS’N, COUNCIL ON MEDICAL SERVICES REPORT 5 (Dec. 2001), at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/7008.html; see also AM. MED. ASS’N,
HEALTH AND ETHICS POLICIES OF THE AM. MED. ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES H285.920,
available
at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/noindex/category/
11760.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005) (setting forth criteria, acceptable to the
medical profession, for the development and use of level of care guidelines).
There is intense debate between the managed care industry and the medical
profession as to whether the guidelines meet these standards.
25. See National Conference of State Legislatures, What Legislators Need to
Know
About
Managed
Care:
Executive
Summary,
at
http://www.ncsl.org/public/catalog /6642ex.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005)
[hereinafter Executive Summary].
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rates substantially reduced from those charged to nonbeneficiaries.
In exchange, the MCOs provide economic inducements to
26
beneficiaries to utilize the providers’ services.
The contracts
between the MCOs and the care providers are sometimes called
“provider panel contracts.” The providers are deemed to belong to
the managed care organization’s “provider panel.”
Such
arrangements are feasible only if large numbers of potential
patients subscribe to the managed care organization’s health care
plan.
Managed care has several drawbacks. First, the process
interposes a potentially disruptive third party, the MCO, into what
should ideally be a private and intimate relationship between
27
patient and physician. Another drawback is that the bureaucratic
procedures and personnel imposed by managed care are sources of
significant inefficiency. A third drawback arises in situations where
optimal medical care is substantially more expensive than
suboptimal care. MCOs have their own, frequently disparaged,
economic incentives that may sacrifice patient welfare to cost
considerations. Today, more than 200 million Americans are
28
covered by private or government-sponsored managed care plans.
A health maintenance organization (HMO) is one type of
MCO. The Federal Health Maintenance Act, defines an HMO as
an entity, organized under state law, that, inter alia, provides basic
29
health services for a predetermined periodic fee.
That fee “is
fixed without regard to the frequency, extent, or kind of service
30
(within the basic health services) actually furnished.” HMOs are
seen as alternatives to the more traditional fee-for-service health
care plans where payments are made for each service rendered. As
with all MCOs, HMOs employ economic incentives to reduce

26. See AM. MED. ASS’N, PRINCIPLES OF MANAGED CARE 2 (5th ed. 2004),
available
at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/363/
principlesmanagecare.pdf.
27. See AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS E-9.123; E-10.01(4), E10.015, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/noindex/category/11760.html
(last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
28. See
America's
Health
Insurance
Plans,
About
AHIP,
at
http://www.ahip.org/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2005) (representing nearly 1300
companies that provide health insurance coverage). An ERISA plan that uses an
MCO to provide or administer benefits is sometimes called a “managed care plan.“
See Executive Summary, supra note 25.
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e(a), (b)(1) (2000).
30. Id. at (b)(1).
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31

overall health care expenditures.
In non-emergency situations, HMOs generally require
32
prospective “utilization review” before providing coverage. HMOs
make their utilization review decisions by interpreting the
33
documents that define their coverage. Such documents regulate
the scope of coverage through specific exclusions and a general
contract term requiring that services and other benefits be
34
“medically necessary.”
Participants (also called “members” or
“beneficiaries”) may appeal adverse coverage determinations
through administrative procedures provided by the HMO or, in
35
most states, by statutorily mandated external reviews.
HMO
participants are also free to obtain whatever health care they
36
choose, so long as they are willing and able to pay for such care.
HMOs provide various mechanisms to challenge prospective
benefit denials.
In the simplest situation, a physician may
telephone or write to an HMO utilization reviewer to explain why
37
the denial was improper. Although third-party health care payers
pay physicians for the provision of medical services, neither HMOs
nor the patients will, as a general rule, pay extra for ancillary efforts
such as writing letters or making telephone calls to HMO
31. Executive Summary, supra note 25.
32. Id.
33. See generally AM. MED. ASS’N, MODEL MANAGED CARE CONTRACT (3d ed.
2002), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/9559.html
[hereinafter AMA, MODEL MANAGED CARE CONTRACT] (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
34. Id. at 39-40. The American Medical Association defines “medical
necessity” as
[h]ealth care services or products that a prudent physician would provide
to a patient for the purpose of preventing, diagnosing or treating an
illness, injury, disease or its symptoms in a manner that is: (a) in
accordance with generally accepted standards of medical practice; (b)
clinically appropriate in terms of type, frequency, extent, site, and
duration; and (c) not primarily for the economic benefit of the health
plans and purchasers or for the convenience of the patient, treating
physician, or other health care provider.
Id.; see also AMA Policy H-320.953(3), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/
noindex/category/11760.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005). While some MCOs have
moved toward the AMA definition, it is not industry standard. Many MCOs
emphasize cost containment as an element of the medical necessity
determination.
35. AMA, MODEL MANAGED CARE CONTRACT, supra note 33, at 40.
36. See Executive Summary, supra note 25.
37. The AMA believes that physicians have an ethical duty to advocate for
their patients with HMOs to secure necessary medical care. AMA CODE OF
MEDICAL ETHICS §§ E-8.13, E-8.135, available at http://www.amaassn.org/ama/noindex/category/ 11760.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
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38

administrators. Time and effort spent by a physician or his office
staff to override an HMO coverage decision will generally go
39
uncompensated.
Because HMOs transfer costs of ongoing medical expenditures
from individual members to a large institution by means of a fixed
40
fee, they are sometimes considered insurance companies.
However, they also decide what medical care is necessary in specific
circumstances and provide care through their panel of physicians
41
and other medical care givers.
Therefore, they may also be
42
deemed, themselves, providers of medical treatment.
Supporters claim that because HMOs have an incentive to
minimize the medical procedures utilized, HMOs reduce waste and
43
encourage preventive care. Detractors counter that the principal
effect is merely to reduce the amount of care received, with little
44
regard for what may be medically necessary.
HMO incentives
have been waggishly critiqued in the following terms:
From a short-term financial standpoint—which we do not
suggest is the only standpoint that an HMO is likely to
have—the HMO’s incentive is to keep you healthy if it can
38. AMA COUNCIL ON MEDICAL SERVICE REPORT, PAYMENT FOR MANAGED CARE
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES 266 (Dec. 1997).
39. Even if the patient wanted to pay the physician for advocating on his
behalf, he probably could not do so. As noted supra, the federal HMO law
specifies that, for basic health services the premium is a fixed sum, regardless of
the extent of basic health services provided. 42 U.S.C. § 300e(b)(1). Arguably,
provider panel contracts could define physician advocacy efforts as something
other than "basic health services" for these purposes. In practice, they do not.
Standard HMO contracts prohibit physicians from receiving any payments from
patients (through what is known as “balance billing”), except under narrowly
defined circumstances. AMA, MODEL MANAGED CARE CONTRACT, supra note 33, §
3.10; see also Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d 922, 923 (1st Cir. 1984)
(upholding a “ban on balance billing” practice if doctors do not make additional
charges).
40. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 366-67 (2002).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d
1406, 1409 (7th Cir. 1995); see America's Health Insurance Plans, Health Care
Quality: Utilization of Health Services, at http://www.ahip.org/content/
default.aspx?bc= 41|331|360 (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
44. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 65 F.3d at 1409. HMO travails are a
popular Hollywood staple. For example, the movies JOHN Q (New Line
Productions, Inc. 2002) (starring Denzel Washington), AS GOOD AS IT GETS
(Columbia/TriStar Studios 1997) (starring Helen Hunt), and THE RAINMAKER
(Paramont Studio 1997) (starring Matt Damon) all addressed heroic efforts by
ordinary citizens to secure payment from the evil HMO for their critically ill
children.
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but if you get very sick, and are unlikely to recover to a
healthy state involving few medical expenses, to let you
die as quickly and cheaply as possible. HMOs compensate
for these perceived drawbacks by charging a lower price
45
than fee-for-service plans.
C. The Patients’ Bill of Rights and the Texas Health Care Liability Act
As observed in Part I.A, ERISA does not substantively regulate
welfare plans. Yet the very nature of the HMO calls for government
regulation. Insurance policies are written in legally dense terms,
prepared solely by HMO attorneys. Huge disparities in size and
sophistication separate an HMO and its individual members. At
the very moment when plan beneficiaries are most in need of the
protection promised by their health insurance companies, they may
be least able to advocate for their rights. The fundamental issue as
to what medical services should be covered in a specific situation is,
at least in the details, beyond a lay person’s capacity to determine.
The potential for deception, overreaching, or other forms of heavyhandedness by MCOs is rife.
In response to the regulatory vacuum, consumer advocates
46
have called for a “patients’ bill of rights.”
The concept, in
essence, describes laws that would protect beneficiaries of MCOs
from wrongful benefit denials by HMOs. At the federal level, it
refers to an amendment to ERISA that would provide tort damages
for such denials. Although bills to this effect have been introduced
in both houses of Congress and have been the subject of nationally
47
televised debate during the past two presidential elections, no
48
such legislation has been passed.
Patients’ rights advocates have been more successful at the
state level. The first state patients’ bill of rights, known as Senate
Bill 386 (S.B. 386), was passed in Texas and took effect May 22,
49
1997. S.B. 386 included THCLA, which imposes tort liability on
MCOs (including HMOs) that fail to exercise ordinary care when
45.
46.

Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 65 F.3d at 1410.
See Sydney A. Halpern, Medical Authority & the Culture of Rights, 29 J.
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 835, 847 (Aug. - Oct. 2004).
47. Commission on Presidential Debates, Debate Transcripts, available at
http:// www.debates.org/pages/debtrans.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
48. See Sylvia A. Law, Do We Still Need a Federal Patients’ Bill of Rights?, 3 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 1, 27-31 (2002) (discussing the political battle over a
patients’ bill of rights).
49. S.B. 386, 1997 Leg., 75th Sess. (Tex. 1997).
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50

making health care treatment decisions.
THCLA section 88.002 states:
A health insurance carrier, health maintenance
organization, or other managed care entity for a health
care plan has the duty to exercise ordinary care when
making health care treatment decisions and is liable for
damages for harm to an insured or enrollee proximately
caused by its failure to exercise such ordinary care. [This
creates] no obligation on the part of the . . . health
maintenance organization . . . to provide to an insured or
enrollee treatment which is not covered by the health care
51
plan . . . .
THCLA section 88.001 states:
(5) Health care treatment decision’ means a
determination made when medical services are actually
provided by the health care plan and a decision which
affects the quality of the diagnosis, care, or treatment
provided to the plan’s insureds or enrollees.
....
(8) ‘Managed care entity’ means any entity which delivers,
administers, or assumes risk for health care services with
systems or techniques to control or influence the quality,
accessibility, utilization, or costs and prices of such
services to a defined enrollee population, but does not
include an employer purchasing coverage . . . on behalf of
its employees or the employees of one or more
subsidiaries or affiliated corporations of the employer . . . .
....
(10) ‘Ordinary care’ means, in the case of a . . . health
maintenance organization . . . that degree of care that a . .
. health maintenance organization . . . of ordinary
prudence would use under the same or similar
52
circumstances.
Almost immediately after its passage, Aetna Insurance
Company, one of the largest insurance companies in the United
States, sued to have S.B. 386 declared invalid as being in conflict

50. Id.
51. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002 (Vernon 1997).
52. Id. at § 88.001. The THCLA definition of “managed care entity” closely
tracks the AMA definition of “managed care.”
See supra note 22 and
accompanying text.
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with ERISA and with the Federal Employees Health Benefit Act.
For the most part, the Fifth Circuit ruled against Aetna and upheld
54
S.B. 386.
It specifically upheld the tort liability provisions, by
holding, in essence, that those provisions regulated health care and
so they did not impinge on the federal regulation of employee
55
benefit plans.
Despite the favorable ruling from the Fifth Circuit, the victory for
THCLA was incomplete. The United States Supreme Court had not
examined THCLA. Until Davila/Calad, whether state laws that impose
such tort liability on HMOs could withstand a Supreme Court challenge
56
remained an open question.
II. THE DAVILA/CALAD CASE
A. Underlying Facts
1.

Davila

Juan Davila was a post-polio patient suffering from diabetes
57
and arthritis.
He received Aetna HMO coverage through his
58
employer’s health plan. Aetna administered the plan by, inter
alia, determining coverage, and it funded the plan by paying for
59
benefits from its own assets.
As part of its benefit structure, Aetna established a formulary
60
to govern the use of prescription drugs. Under the formulary,
Aetna unconditionally approved certain drugs, without a precertification requirement, so long as it deemed them medically

53. Corp. Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins., 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000),
reh’g denied, 220 F.3d 641 (2000), vacated in part on other grounds, sub nom.
Montemayor v. Corp. Health Ins., 536 U.S. 935 (2002); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001461 (ERISA); 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-13 (Federal Employees Health Benefit Act).
54. 215 F.3d at 526.
55. Id. at 534.
56. When Davila/Calad was decided, fourteen states had laws imposing tort
liability against HMOs for incorrect decisions as to proper health care treatment.
See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Managed Care Insurer Liability, at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/liable.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
57. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub nom.
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004).
58. Id.
59. See Brief for Petitioner Aetna Health, Inc., at 6, Aetna Health, Inc. v.
Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004) (No. 02-1845) (Dec. 18, 2003), available at 2003 WL
23010751 [hereinafter Aetna Brief].
60. Id. at 8.
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61

necessary.
Other medications, however, which were more
62
expensive, required a “step-therapy program.”
Under the formulary’s step-therapy program, the patient
would first have to try alternative, less expensive medications
63
unconditionally listed in the formulary. The patient would have
to demonstrate that those less expensive medications were
ineffective or caused intolerable side effects before Aetna would
64
pay for the more expensive medication. However, the patient’s
physician could explain to Aetna why the unconditionally approved
drugs might be inappropriate for a particular patient, because of
65
an allergy or other contraindication.
If Aetna accepted that
explanation, it would allow the patient to bypass the step-therapy
66
program and move immediately to a more expensive drug.
Davila’s primary care physician, who served on Aetna’s
provider panel (and was therefore paid by Aetna), prescribed
67
Vioxx for Davila’s arthritic pain.
Vioxx, an anti-inflammatory
drug known as a Cox 2 inhibitor, was at the time commonly
prescribed for treatment of chronic pain. Some studies had shown
that Cox 2 inhibitors have a lower rate of gastrointestinal toxicity
(e.g., bleeding, ulceration, perforation of the stomach) than do
68
similar but older drugs, including drugs known as Cox 1
69
Aetna’s formulary listed fifteen other drugs for
inhibitors.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 2002), reversed sub nom.
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004).
65. See Aetna Brief, supra note 59, at 9. A physician who feels that an HMO’s
step-therapy program should be bypassed for a specific patient will generally be
uncompensated for the effort required to communicate this recommendation to
the HMO. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
66. Aetna Brief, supra note 59, at 9. Step-therapy programs and drug
formularies are standard features of HMO plans. They are designed to steer
beneficiaries toward less expensive medications, which the HMO deems to be
clinical near-equivalents of the more costly drugs. See Associates & Wilson,
Prescription Drug Benefit Management: Improving Quality, Promoting Better Access, and
Reducing
Costs,
America’s
Health
Insurance
Plans,
at
http://ahip.org/content/fileviewer.aspx?docid=170&linkid=1295 (Oct. 2003).
67. Aetna Brief, supra note 59, at 8.
68. PHYSICIANS DESK REFERENCE 2048 (Thompson eds., 58th ed. 2004).
69. Prescription of Vioxx has since been generally shown to be clinically
unwarranted, due to side effects previously not fully recognized and also due to
the availability of efficacious alternative medications. Its manufacturer has
withdrawn the drug from further distribution. Merck Halts Vioxx Sales on Health
Threats, Associated Press Release (Sept. 30, 2004); U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Vioxx (rofecoxib)
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treatment of chronic arthritis, which it had unconditionally
approved. Vioxx, being more expensive, would not be covered
unless Davila had first tried two of the unconditionally approved
70
drugs and found them unsuitable.
Davila’s physician did not explain to Aetna why it should
bypass the step-therapy program, and so Aetna refused to pay for
71
the Vioxx despite what the complaint alleged to be the physician’s
72
“protests.” Consequently, as an alternative to the Vioxx, Davila’s
73
physician prescribed Naprosyn, a Cox 1 inhibitor listed as
74
unconditionally approved on the drug formulary.
After three weeks on the Naprosyn, Davila was rushed to the
75
emergency room. Emergency room doctors reported that Davila
was suffering from ulcers, which were bleeding internally and had
76
nearly led to a heart attack. The hospital gave Davila seven units
77
of blood and kept him in critical care for five days. Subsequently,
he was unable to take any pain medication that would be absorbed
78
through the stomach. Davila attributed his bleeding to his use of
79
Naprosyn.
2.

Calad

Through her husband’s employer, Ruby Calad became a
beneficiary of CIGNA HealthCare of Texas, Inc. (CIGNA), a Texas
80
HMO. Calad underwent a hysterectomy with rectal, bladder, and
81
vaginal repair.
A physician on CIGNA’s provider panel
82
performed the surgery.
Questions and Answers, at http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/vioxx/
vioxxQA.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2005).
70. Aetna Brief, supra note 59, at 9.
71. Id.
72. Plaintiff's Original Petition ¶ 13, Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila (on file with
author).
73. PHYSICIANS DESK REFERENCE, supra note 68.
74. Vioxx and Naprosyn are known as nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs
(NSAIDs). The most famous and widely used NSAID is common aspirin.
75. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub nom.
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 302.
81. Id.
82. See Brief for Petitioner CIGNA Healthcare of Texas, Inc. at 3, Aetna
Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004) (No. 03-83) (Dec. 18, 2003), available
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The contract between CIGNA and Calad’s husband’s employer
provided that CIGNA would, with certain exceptions, pay its
83
beneficiaries’ medically necessary health care expenses. Under its
standard guidelines, CIGNA generally deems a one-day stay in the
hospital sufficient after a hysterectomy and ordinarily refuses to pay
84
hospital benefits beyond that day.
In this instance, Calad’s surgeon recommended a longer stay
85
CIGNA’s hospital discharge nurse, however,
than one-day.
reviewed the file and determined that the standard one-day
86
hospital stay was medically sufficient.
Based on her
determination, CIGNA refused to authorize payment beyond one
87
day.
Either because she was unable or unwilling to pay for the
additional care out of her own pocket (or perhaps did not fully
understand the situation or appreciate the medical consequences),
Calad had herself discharged from the hospital after the one day
88
that CIGNA had authorized. Subsequently, however, she suffered
complications from the surgery. A few days later she returned to
the emergency room for further treatment. She attributed the
89
complications to her early release from the hospital.
B. Lower Court Proceedings
90

Davila and Calad sued separately in Texas state court,
alleging violations of THCLA. Davila claimed that Aetna had failed
to exercise ordinary care when it refused to pay for his Vioxx, and
Calad claimed that CIGNA had failed to exercise ordinary care
91
when it refused to pay for her extended hospital stay. The HMOs
removed their respective cases to federal district court pursuant to
92
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) based on federal question jurisdiction. Davila
and Calad moved to remand, and the HMOs opposed their
motions on the grounds that ERISA section 502(a) completely
at 2003 WL 23010752.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 3-4.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. Davila and Calad used the same lawyer.
91. Id.
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
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93

preempted THCLA. The district courts agreed, determining that
the only cause of action available was under ERISA, and denied the
94
motions to remand.
Both Davila and Calad refused to amend
their pleadings to bring explicit ERISA claims, and the district
courts dismissed the cases with prejudice under Federal Rule of
95
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Davila and Calad appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which consolidated their cases and
96
joined them with two other similar suits. While the procedural
postures of the two other lawsuits were slightly different from the
97
Davila and Calad cases, all of the cases raised the same ultimate
legal issue—whether ERISA section 502(a) preempted THCLA
98
claims against employer-sponsored HMOs.
The Roark decision observed that ERISA section 502(a) lists
various remedies established by Congress to rectify ERISA
violations. The court noted that in prior cases it had deemed some
99
claims related to ERISA plans to be “completely preempted.” If
state causes of action “duplicate[] or fall[] within the scope of an
ERISA section 502(a) remedy,” they are completely preempted and
100
removable to federal court.
Otherwise, they are not completely
101
preempted and not removable to federal court.
The question
was whether the Davila/Calad lawsuits sought to duplicate or fall
within the scope of the ERISA section 502(a) remedies.
After examining the causes of action available under section
502(a), the court determined that most of the section 502(a)

93. See Brief for Petitioner CIGNA Healthcare of Texas, Inc. at 3, Aetna
Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004) (No. 03-83) (Dec. 18, 2003), available
at 2003 WL 23010752.
94. Id.
95. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 302-03 (5th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub
nom. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004).
96. The two other suits were also brought by the same lawyer for the
plaintiffs. The Fifth Circuit decision for the consolidated cases is published as
Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2002). Roark is the plaintiff’s name
in one of the companion lawsuits and Humana was the HMO sued in that case.
97. For example, in one of the companion suits the district court judge had
granted the motion to remand, finding the THCLA claim not preempted
98. The other two cases ultimately settled and were not argued before the
United States Supreme Court. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298 (5th Cir.
2002), cert. dismissed, 539 U.S. 986 (2003).
99. See Roark, 307 F.3d at 309.
100. Id. at 305 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
101. Id.
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102

remedies were clearly inapplicable.
Arguably, though, the
Davila/Calad claims might fall under either of two provisions of
section 502(a): section 502(a)(1)(B), which provides a cause of
action for the recovery of wrongfully denied benefits, or section
502(a)(2), which allows suit against a plan fiduciary for breaches of
103
fiduciary duty to the plan.
Analyzing section 502(a)(2), the court determined that the
decisions for which the HMOs were being sued were “mixed
eligibility and treatment decisions,” as described in Pegram v.
104
105
Herdrich and, hence, were not fiduciary in nature.
Thus,
106
The court next found that
section 502(a)(2) was inapplicable.
Davila’s and Calad’s claims did not fall within the scope of section
502(a)(1)(B) either. The court noted that Section 502(a)(1)(B)
creates a cause of action for reimbursement of wrongfully denied
107
benefits—essentially, a claim for breach of contract.
Davila and
Calad, however, were seeking tort damages, arising from “an
108
external, statutorily imposed duty of ‘ordinary care.’”
The Fifth Circuit concluded that because the THCLA cause of
action was different from the causes of action listed in section
502(a) it was not completely preempted. Accordingly, Davila and
Calad had brought valid suits under a state law, and there was no
reason to dismiss those suits for failure to state a cause of action or
to infer that a THCLA claim was one that could only be brought
under a federal statute, ERISA. Therefore, because the court did
not have federal question jurisdiction, the trial courts should have
109
granted the motions to remand.
The court reversed the Davila
110
and Calad cases on that basis.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 305-06.
104. 530 U.S. 211, 229 (2000).
105. Pegram held that a decision by a physician acting on behalf of an HMO as
to the proper course of medical treatment for a plan beneficiary was not fiduciary
in nature, within the meaning of ERISA section 502(a)(2). Id. The Court
characterized the physician’s decision as to how the patient should be treated for
appendicitis as one of “mixed eligibility and treatment,” because the patient’s
eligibility for benefits from the HMO depended on that treatment decision. Id.
Pegram concerned liability under ERISA itself (holding that there was no such
liability) and did not address preemption of state law. Id.
106. Roark, 307 F.3d at 308.
107. Id. at 309.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 315.
110. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court decisions in the companion
suits, which were in a different procedural posture from the Davila and Calad
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C. Conflict in the Courts
Aetna and CIGNA both petitioned the Supreme Court for
certiorari. The Fifth Circuit had relied heavily on the Pegram
rationale, and judicial decisions before Pegram became arguably
irrelevant to a current understanding of the law. Thus, one might
have expected a passage of several years before the lower courts
could develop an analysis of “mixed eligibility and treatment
decisions.” This was not so.
The question of HMO tort liability for medical necessity
decisions was too important to remain on the back burner. By
2003, when the Supreme Court addressed the writ of certiorari
petitions, a clear split had already developed in the lower court
111
112
decisions. Land v. CIGNA Healthcare of Florida, Cicio v. Does, and
113
Pappas v. Asbel all held that ERISA does not completely preempt
state laws of negligence against HMOs who withhold payment of
health care benefits because they have determined that proposed
treatment is medically unnecessary—a “mixed eligibility and
114
treatment decision” under Pegram. On the other hand, DiFelice v.
115
Aetna U.S. Healthcare held in favor of complete ERISA preemption
116
Unlike the Davila/Calad suit, all of those cases
of state law.
considered common law negligence, rather than a statute
specifically tailored to the health insurance industry, such as
THCLA. The Court granted certiorari to CIGNA and Aetna on
117
November 3, 2003.

cases. In the Roark case itself, the panel held that ERISA did preempt THCLA,
stating that it might have decided against preemption “[i]f we were writing on a
clean slate.” Id. at 313. However, it felt procedurally bound by what it deemed a
“factually indistinguishable” precedent, Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d
1321 (5th Cir. 1992). Id. The panel intimated that an en banc court might decide
this issue differently. Id. However, a later request for en banc hearing was denied.
Roark v. Humana, Inc., Nos. 01-10831, 01-10891, 01-10905, 2003 WL 21018397 (5th
Cir. Apr. 15, 2003). As observed supra, note 98, both companion cases then
settled.
111. 339 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2003).
112. 321 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2003).
113. 768 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2001).
114. 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
115. 346 F.3d 442 (3d Cir. 2003).
116. Id. at 449.
117. CIGNA HealthCare of Tex., Inc. v. Calad, cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 463
(2003); Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 462 (2003).
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D. Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court, after first recounting the underlying facts
of the Davila/Calad case and the Fifth Circuit decision, explained
the general nature of the complete preemption doctrine. Under
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a civil action filed in a state court can be
removed to a federal court if the plaintiff could have filed in
federal court initially and the federal court would have had proper
subject matter jurisdiction. One such category of suit is a “federal
question” case: a case “arising under the Constitution, laws, or
118
treaties of the United States.”
The issue in Davila/Calad was
whether those actions had arisen under the laws of the United
States, notwithstanding that the complaints on their face purported
to be based solely on violations of THCLA and never mentioned
ERISA or any other federal law.
Under the “well-pleaded complaint” rule, the determination of
federal question jurisdiction comes from the plaintiff’s statement of
his own claim. If the plaintiff asserts a cause of action necessarily
based on a federal law, then the federal courts could have had
jurisdiction over the case and the suit can be removed from state to
federal court. If the claim is not based on federal law, however, it is
119
not removable. The well-pleaded complaint rule applies even if it
is certain that the defendant will argue federal law to defend
against the claim. In fact, it applies even if the complaint explicitly
anticipates, on its face, that a federal law will be raised in defense
120
and it then cites to that law. As long as the complaint raises solely
121
state law claims it is not removable.
An exception arises, however, if a federal statute “wholly
displaces the state-law cause of action through complete pre122
emption.” This occurs when Congress intends that federal law is
to regulate all aspects of a particular area of law. In such instances,
federal law preempts state law, and even if the claim is couched
solely in terms of a state law claim, the claim is deemed to be based
123
on federal law. When a claim is made in a completely preempted
area of law it is removable to the federal courts. ERISA, the Court
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
119. Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2494 (2004).
120. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987).
121. Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2494.
122. Id. at 2494-95 (quoting Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8
(2003)).
123. Id. at 2495.
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124

held, is one of those statutes giving rise to complete preemption.
The Court cited three factors to justify its conclusion that
ERISA completely preempts state law. First, ERISA sets out
substantive regulatory requirements for employee benefit plans,
which establish a “uniform regulatory regime,” including a detailed
125
catalogue of remedies and sanctions for violations of the statute.
Thus, “[t]he policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain
remedies and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme
would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and
beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under the state law that
126
127
Second, ERISA section 514
Congress rejected in ERISA.”
includes expansive pre-emption provisions. These ensure that
employee benefit plan regulation is to be exclusively a federal
128
129
concern.
Third, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor had
found the language of ERISA to be similar to the language of
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
130
(LMRA). Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, International Association
131
of Machinists held that LMRA section 301 converts state causes of
132
action into federal ones to determine the propriety of removal
and therefore ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) should be given the
133
same weight.
Thus, the ERISA civil enforcement mechanism
should be deemed a provision with “such extraordinary preemptive power” that, for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint
rule, it converts an ordinary state law complaint into a federal
134
claim.
Next, the Court held that because ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B)
sets forth remedies for denial of coverage promised under an
employee benefit plan, a suit complaining of a benefit denial is
limited to ERISA remedies unless the benefit denial gives rise to a
135
violation of law independent of ERISA and of the plan terms. In
Davila/Calad, the only complaints were that the HMOs denied the
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 418 U.S. 41, 42 (1987)).
29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000).
Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2495-96.
481 U.S. 58 (1987).
Id. at 65-66; see 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2000).
390 U.S. 557 (1968).
Id. at 560.
Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2496.
Id.
Id.
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coverage promised under the terms of ERISA-regulated employee
benefit plans. Davila and Calad premised their cases under
THCLA, but their THCLA claims derived from the rights and
obligations established by the benefit plans, which were federally
136
regulated contracts.
Hence, regardless of their characterization,
Davila’s and Calad’s claims fell within the scope of ERISA section
502(a)(1)(B) and were completely preempted and removable to
137
federal court.
The Court then disposed of the argument, made in the Fifth
138
Circuit and in several other lower courts, that mixed eligibility
and treatment decisions, as described in Pegram, should fall outside
ERISA’s preemptive scope. Pegram, it said, should be limited to
situations where the person making the coverage decisions is also
139
the claimant’s treating physician.
Here, there was no such
relationship between Davila, Calad, and their respective HMOs.
The decisions in this case were “pure eligibility decisions,” and
140
thus, Pegram was not implicated.
Accordingly, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s judgment
and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its findings
of complete pre-emption under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) and
141
valid removability to the federal courts.
While not explicitly
stated, the clear inference was that the courts were to dismiss the
complaints because Davila and Calad had announced that they
142
would not amend their complaints to allege ERISA-based claims.
While the decision was unanimous, Justice Ginsburg, joined by
143
She noted that the
Justice Breyer, filed a concurring opinion.
Court’s decisions in this area had “yielded a host of situations in
which persons adversely affected by ERISA-proscribed wrongdoing
144
cannot gain make-whole relief.” A “gaping wound” was caused by
“the breadth of preemption and limited remedies under ERISA, as
145
interpreted by this Court.” She therefore joined a “rising judicial
chorus urging that Congress and this Court revisit what is an unjust
136. Id. at 2496-97.
137. Id. at 2498.
138. See supra Part II.C.
139. Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2501.
140. Id. at 2502.
141. Id.
142. That is, in fact, what subsequently happened.
Healthcare of Tex., Inc., 388 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2004).
143. Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2503-04.
144. Id. at 2503.
145. Id.
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146

and increasingly tangled ERISA regime.”
III. ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court decision set forth two principal,
intertwined holdings. First, the Court directly mandated that
lawsuits by beneficiaries of most employer-sponsored health plans
147
against their health insurance companies should be deemed to
raise a federal question and therefore be removable to the federal
148
courts even if they were purportedly based on state law.
This
holding concerns an area of federal civil procedure and has only a
limited impact.
The second, more consequential holding is that state laws that
impose tort liability on ERISA-covered MCOs for wrongful denial of
149
medical benefits are invalid.
This holding, because of its
substantive character, is further reaching than the procedural one.
Both holdings are questionable readings of the controlling statutes
and of the relevant policy considerations.
As Justice Ginsburg intimated, few, if any, areas of law are
150
The Supreme
more tangled than that of ERISA preemption.
Court has written extensively on this narrow issue and has
151
repeatedly revised its holdings. To explore the topic’s intricacies,
146. Id. (quoting DiFelice v. Aetna United States Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 453
(3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., concurring)).
147. In 2003, approximately 159-million Americans were insured under
employer-sponsored health plans. See Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance: Trends in
Cost and Access, RESEARCH IN ACTION (Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality,
Rockville,
Md.),
at
1,
2
(Sept.
2004),
available
at
http://www.ahrq.gov/research/empspria/ empspria.pdf. Not all of these are
covered by ERISA, as ERISA does not apply to plans maintained by governmental
entities or certain churches. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (2000).
148. Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2495.
149. The Davila/Calad suit was brought against two HMOs for denial of
allegedly necessary medical services. The Davila/Calad holding is broad enough to
immunize any employer sponsored health plan against tort liability for denial of
promised benefits. As a practical matter, tort claims, were they allowed, would
almost always be confined to HMOs on account of medical necessity denials. This
is because the practice of prospective utilization review is largely confined to
HMOs, and that practice is what generally gives rise to tort claims in the managed
care context. See supra Part I.B. However, managed care plans other than HMOs
also engage in utilization review, and such review could, on occasion, give rise to a
tort claim. See Rubin-Schneiderman v. Merit Behavioral Care Corp., No. 00 Civ.
8101, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14811 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2003) (tort claim made
against preferred provider organization, another type of managed care entity).
150. Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2503 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
151. At least twenty Supreme Court decisions, not counting Davila/Calad, have
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the analysis of Davila/Calad must follow a twisted and somewhat
tortuous path. The basic points are: (1) the Davila/Calad decision
is inconsistent with a specific statutory provision, ERISA section
514(b); (2) the decision is inconsistent with several considerations
of public policy, as enunciated in numerous Supreme Court
decisions and in ERISA itself; and (3) the rationales that support
the Court’s holding are flimsy.
A. The Procedural Holding: Removal Jurisdiction Through
Recharacterization of State Law Claims
With minor exceptions, federal courts only have such
152
jurisdiction as is granted by specific Congressional enactments.
The underlying jurisdictional law cited in Davila/Calad was 28
U.S.C. § 1331, the federal question statute, which provides that
“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
153
actions arising under the . . . laws . . . of the United States.”
Consistent with the constitutional doctrine that national
154
governmental powers are limited in nature, federal jurisdictional
statutes, including the federal question statute, are construed
155
against the exercise of federal court jurisdiction.
One aspect of
this doctrine of strict statutory construction is the well-pleaded
complaint rule, which was first recognized in Louisville & Nashville
156
Railroad v. Mottley.
In that case, the complaint alleged a claim
decided the appropriate scope of ERISA preemption, under varying
circumstances. See KAHP, 538 U.S. 329 (2003); Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v.
Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001); UNUM
Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999); Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833
(1997); De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997);
Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 519 U.S.
316 (1997); N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins., 514 U.S. 645 (1995); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust and Sav.
Bank, 510 U.S. 86 (1993); District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506
U.S. 125 (1992); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990); FMC
Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107
(1989); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988);
Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987);
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
152. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
154. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000).
155. Kresberg v. Int’l Paper Co., 149 F.2d 911, 913 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 764 (1945).
156. 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
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157

based on state law.
It further alleged that the defense would be
based on a federal law, which in turn was alleged to be invalid
158
under the United States Constitution.
The Supreme Court held
that such pleading did not give rise to federal question jurisdiction
because the complaint would have been sufficient if it had merely
asserted the state law claim without anticipating the federal
159
defense.
The nature of the underlying claim and not the
160
defenses defined the legal issues for purposes of jurisdiction.
The well-pleaded complaint rule has been defined as follows:
“a case will be said to ‘arise under’ federal law only if the presence
of the federal issue or issues can be ascertained from the plaintiff’s
well-pleaded complaint, that is, a complaint that does not
anticipate possible federal defenses that the defendant might
161
162
raise.”
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, a suit by a union employee
against an employer, found the state law not to be preempted and
gave the following rationale for the rule:
[T]he presence of a federal question . . . in a defensive
argument does not overcome the paramount policies
embodied in the well-pleaded complaint rule—that the
plaintiff is the master of the complaint, that a federal
question must appear on the face of the complaint, and
that the plaintiff may, by eschewing claims based on
federal law, choose to have the cause heard in state
163
court.
A preemption defense, based on the invalidity of the state law
164
It must
that underlies a claim, is deemed affirmative in nature.
be specifically raised in the defensive pleadings, and ordinarily it
165
will not, by itself, justify removal jurisdiction.
The well-pleaded complaint rule is also justified on the
grounds of consistency. While the plaintiff can choose between a
federal or a state forum, that choice is determined according to the

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id. at 150-52.
Id. at 153-54.
Id.
15 JAMES WM. MOORE & DANIEL R. COQUILLETE, MOORE’S FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 103.40 (3d ed. 1997).
162. 482 U.S. 386 (1987).
163. Id. at 398-99.
164. 5 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1271 n.56 (3d ed. 1992).
165. Id.
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166

nature of the claim, rather than the vagaries of the pleadings.
Furthermore, it is straightforward and relatively easy to apply.
Certainly, it has attained a historical validity and has become
167
generally appreciated as a desirable aspect of federalism.
In addition to statutes that allow plaintiffs to obtain original
federal court jurisdiction, the removal laws allow defendants to
have cases transferred from state to federal courts. The provisions
purportedly justifying removal in the Davila/Calad case were 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a) and (b), which state as follows:
§ 1441. Actions removable generally
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of
Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of
which the district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the
defendants, to the district court of the United States for
the district and division embracing the place where such
action is pending. For purposes of removal under this
chapter, the citizenship of defendants sued under
fictitious names shall be disregarded.
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising
under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United
States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship
or residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be
removable only if none of the parties in interest properly
joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in
168
which such action is brought.
169
and
Removal jurisdiction is generally disfavored,
uncertainties in the application of these statutes are resolved in
170
support of remand. This construction mirrors that of the statutes
giving rise to original federal jurisdiction.
It follows the
166. 13 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3522 (2d ed. 1987).
167. The well-pleaded complaint rule has nevertheless been criticized as a
doctrine that “makes no sense.” 15 MOORE, supra note 161, § 103.41.
168. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a),(b) (2000).
169. 16 MOORE, supra note 161, §107.06.
170. Removal from the state to the federal courts is accomplished by the
defendant’s filing of a notice of removal with the clerk of the state court. Removal
is non-discretionary. 28 U.S.C. § 1446. To undo the removal, the plaintiff moves
for remandment with the federal court, which then considers whether it has the
necessary jurisdiction. The court may also remand sua sponte, if it determines that
it lacks jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1447.
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constitutional precepts that the federal government was created
with limited powers and that the federal courts should have only
171
such jurisdiction as Congress granted them.
Apart from these constitutional considerations, strict
construction of the removal statute is justified by concerns of
judicial efficiency. An order denying a motion to remand, being
interlocutory, is ordinarily not appealable until after the entry of
172
If, following denial of remand, the court of
final judgment.
appeals determines that the case should have been remanded for
lack of federal court jurisdiction, the judgment on the merits must
173
also be vacated.
If the remand order was incorrect, then the
174
defendant may have lost the right to litigate in federal court, but
the ultimate state court judgment will not suffer from a lack of
175
Thus, an improper remand is less
subject matter jurisdiction.
wasteful of judicial resources than an improper denial of a request
for a remand.
Furthermore, because original jurisdiction statutes and
removal jurisdiction statutes are both construed against federal
court jurisdiction, they are easy to apply and understand. The
federal courts do not need to reconcile competing policy
considerations because the considerations are identical under both
statutes. Until the Supreme Court created an exception to these
jurisdictional rules, the rules gave a consistent result across all
actions.
If exception is to be made, as Davila/Calad itself suggests, the
exception should be based on a “clear” and not a speculative
176
reading of congressional intent. Or, as Justice Frankfurter said:
Federal legislation . . . cannot therefore be construed
without regard to the implications of our dual system of
government . . . . [I]t is not to be assumed as a matter of
course that when Congress adopts a new scheme for
federal . . . regulation, it deals with all situations falling
within the general mischief which gave rise to the
legislation . . . . [W]hen the Federal Government takes
over . . . and thereby radically readjusts the balance of
state and national authority, those charged with the duty
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

16 MOORE, supra note 161, §107.05.
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1981).
An order of remand is generally not appealable. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).
16 MOORE, supra note 161, §107.05.
124 S. Ct. at 2494-95.
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177

of legislating [must be] reasonably explicit.
The strength of the Supremacy Clause is not undermined by
178
this analysis. In deciding whether a case is decided by a state or a
federal court, a rule established by state law must give way to a
179
conflicting rule established by federal law.
The only issue
addressed by the well-pleaded complaint rule, and by the rules of
construction applicable to the federal question and removal
statutes, is who should make these decisions—a state court or a
federal one.
The Davila/Calad case espoused a radical exception to these
restricted views of federal court jurisdiction, holding that the
Davila/Calad claims fell within Avco’s “complete preemption”
180
doctrine.
In a suit by a beneficiary against an employersponsored health insurance plan, the court, not the plaintiff,
should be the master of the complaint. The benefits of orderliness,
judicial efficiency, and ease of understanding should not be
determinative. Federalist concerns are trumped because ERISA,
supposedly, shows that Congress intended an exception to the
traditional rules of pleading and the construction of jurisdictional
statutes.
181
ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B), which the Court interpreted as
creating an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, is as
follows:
A civil action may be brought—(1) by a participant or
beneficiary— . . . (B) to recover benefits due to him
under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under
the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future
182
benefits under the terms of the plan.
This statute says nothing about jurisdiction or about re183
characterization of pleadings. ERISA section 502(e)(1), however,
speaks directly to jurisdiction. ERISA section 502(e)(1) says (in
177. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 527, 540 (1947).
178. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
179. Id.
180. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 560-61 (1968). Avco was
based on LMRA §301. It held that any suit brought to enforce a collective
bargaining agreement is inherently federal in character, even if the complaint
purports to be based solely on state law. Id. The case did not use the expression
“complete preemption.”
181. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000).
182. Id.
183. ERISA § 502(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1).
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relevant part):
Except for actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this
section [viz., ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B)], the district
courts of the United States shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of civil actions under this subchapter . . . .
State courts of competent jurisdiction and district courts
of the United States shall have concurrent jurisdiction of
actions under paragraphs (1)(B) and (7) of subsection
184
(a) . . . .
Therefore, Congress specifically said that the state and federal
courts would have concurrent jurisdiction over suits brought under
185
ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B). Congress did not say whether state
law causes of action against HMOs should be recharacterized as
federal pleadings.
The statute does suggest, however, that
Congress was not concerned with preventing state courts from
hearing lawsuits by plan beneficiaries against employer sponsored
health plans. The inferences from ERISA section 502(e)(1) and
the pertinent policy considerations imply that Congressional intent
regarding federal court jurisdiction was not the clear mandate the
Court invoked.
In fact, the main challenge to the procedural holding does not
lie in either the implications to be drawn from ERISA section
502(e)(1) or in the general policy considerations applicable to
federal question jurisdiction. Rather, the main challenge to the
procedural holding lies in the specific language of ERISA section
186
514,
which explicitly defines the intended scope of ERISA
preemption. Here, the procedural issues become intertwined with
the substance of the statute, and so the analysis moves to the
substantive holding. A later section discusses how that decision
187
impacts the jurisdictional holding.
B. The Substantive Holding: Invalidity of the Tort Liability Provisions of
the Texas Health Care Liability Act
The main impact of the Davila/Calad case is not its
jurisdictional holding. Far and away, Davila/Calad’s primary effect
is the determination that ERISA preempts and thus invalidates state
laws that purport to impose tort liability against HMOs. On this,
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Id.; ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(1)(B) (2000).
ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144.
See infra Part III.B.1.c.
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the primary aspect of the case, the Court’s reasoning was
significantly wanting.
1.

ERISA Section 514
a.

Background

On the substantive issue, the Davila/Calad Court stated that
“‘[t]he six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found
in §502(a) of the [ERISA] statute . . . provide strong evidence that
Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply
188
forgot to incorporate expressly.’”
In addition, the Court held
that “any state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or
supplants the ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the
clear congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive and
189
is therefore pre-empted.”
As can be readily seen by cursory inspection, there are nine,
190
not six, civil enforcement provisions in ERISA section 502(a).
It
is possible, though, that the Court was referring to provisions 1, 2,
191
3, 4, 8, and 9, which allow enforcement by private persons, as “the
192
six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions.” Regardless
of how one does the counting, if ERISA section 502(a) were viewed
in a vacuum, an inference of implied preemption of all state
remedies would be reasonable. Whether the evidence for such
inference is “strong” and whether the Congressional intent is
“clear,” as the Court maintains, are questionable points, but,
hyperbole aside, the conclusion is certainly defendable. Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another) is an accepted and justifiable rule of statutory
193
construction.
The primary determinant of Congressional intent must be the
194
statutory language itself, viewed in its entirety. No section of the
188. Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2495 (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987)).
189. Id. ERISA § 502(a) is attached to this article as Exhibit A.
190. ERISA §§ 502(a)(1)-(9), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132 (a)(1)-(9).
191. ERISA §§ 502(a)(1)-(4), (8), (9), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132 (a)(1)-(4), (8), (9).
192. Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2495 (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987)).
193. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (citing
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163, 168 (1993)).
194. Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104 (1993).
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statute should be viewed in isolation, but all relevant provisions
195
must be considered. Thus, section 502(a) should not be read in
isolation from other sections of ERISA.
Congress specifically spoke to which state laws are to be
preempted and which are not. The Court did not have to infer
anything, and it did not have to decide whether evidence was
strong or whether the implied legislative intent was clear. Nothing
was left for deep legal analysis, except how to interpret the words
Congress had written. While such interpretation has turned out to
be difficult, that should have been the starting point (and, in fact,
the ending point as well). The applicable provisions are located in
196
ERISA sections 514(a) and (b).
Section 514(a) declares that ERISA is to supersede state laws
which “relate to” employee benefit plans (with the exception of
those plans described in ERISA section 4(b), which are relatively
197
few in number and are irrelevant to the present discussion). On
its face, this appears to be broad language. However, section
514(b)(2)(A), the key provision for purposes of this article, states
in relevant part that, with one exception, “nothing in this title
[ERISA] shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from
198
any law of any State which regulates insurance . . . .”
Section
514(b)(2)(A) is sometimes called “the insurance savings clause” or
199
simply the “savings clause.” Section 514(b)(2)(A) is an exception
to section 514(a). It says that some state regulations, even if they
200
relate to employee benefit plans, are not to be preempted.
201
is the one
Section 514(b)(2)(B), called the “deemer clause,”
202
exception to (or at least a limitation on) section 514(b)(2)(A).
Although the preemptive force of ERISA seems to be a narrow,
technical issue, the Supreme Court has devoted enormous effort to
195. United States Nat’l. Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508
U.S. 439, 454-55 (1993); Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 223 (1984).
196. ERISA §§ 514(a), (b), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(a), (b). The relevant portions of
ERISA § 514 are attached to this article as Exhibit B.
197. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
198. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 733 (1985)
(coining the term “deemer clause”).
202. Thus, state laws are valid, except as they relate to ERISA plans, except as
they are saved, except as the “deemer clause” applies. The deemer clause, then, is
an exception to an exception to an exception. Each step of this analysis is
technical and complicated.
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203

construing ERISA section 514.
Older cases interpreting this
language gave an expansive reading to section 514(a) and,
204
conversely, a narrow reading to the Insurance Savings Clause.
205
Starting with its decision in Travelers, however, the Court has
206
adopted a much more restrictive reading of section 514(a).
Recognizing that a literal, dictionary interpretation of the “relate
to” language of section 514(a) can lead to absurd results, the Court
inferred certain limitations to section 514(a), particularly in areas
of the law that may have only an indirect effect on the regulation of
employee benefit plans. Furthermore, in areas “traditionally
occupied by the States” there is a “starting presumption that
207
Congress does not intend to supplant state law.” Concomitantly,
with its contraction of section 514(a), the Court has expanded the
208
scope of the Insurance Savings Clause.
b.

Application to the Substantive Holding

THCLA singles out MCOs, including HMOs, for tort liability.
209
The Court in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. held that any state law
having a connection with or making a reference to covered
210
While later
employee benefit plans falls within section 514(a).
211
Court decisions have refined and clarified the Shaw holding, the
case has never been overturned. In light of the directness of the
connection between THCLA and ERISA-covered health plans, it
would be reasonable to argue that THCLA sections 88.001-88.003,
in the context of Davila/Calad, “relate to” an employer-sponsored
212
benefit plan.
203. See supra note 151.
204. See Shaw v. Delta Airlines Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46
(1987).
205. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.,
514 U.S. 645, 661-62 (1995).
206. See, e.g., De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806
(1997); California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr.,
N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316 (1997).
207. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 654-55.
208. See, e.g., Ky. Assoc. of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003)
[hereinafter KAHP]; Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002);
UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999).
209. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
210. Id. at 100.
211. See, e.g., Travelers, 514 U.S. at 645.
212. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 88.001-.003 (West 2004). In anticipation
of its later holding in Roark v. Humana, 307 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2002), the Fifth
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The catch, however, is that the insurance savings clause
establishes specific exceptions to the general preemption rule of
213
ERISA section 514(a).
A state law “which regulates insurance” is
214
not to be preempted. The Court has grappled at length with the
term “regulates insurance.” Both of those words are technical in
nature, and so the Court has developed (and then repeatedly
modified) various formulas to define those terms within the
context of the insurance savings clause. Thus, it requires some
analysis to determine whether THCLA sections 88.001-88.003 fall
within that clause, and it requires even more analysis to consider
what effect, if any, the deemer clause should have on the final
215
result.
The two most recent Supreme Court interpretations of the
insurance savings clause strongly suggest that the tort liability
216
provisions of THCLA should have been saved from preemption.
In KAHP, the Court held that a state law regulates insurance if (1)
it is specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance and
(2) it “substantially affect[s] the risk pooling arrangement between
217
the insurer and the insured.” THCLA section 88.002(a) imposes
liability against “[a] health insurance carrier, health maintenance
218
organization, or other managed care entity.”
In Rush Prudential,
the Court held that an HMO is an insurer for insurance savings
219
Therefore, THCLA should satisfy the first
clause purposes.
KAHP requirement. THCLA almost certainly meets the second
Circuit in Corporate Health Insurance, Inc. v. Texas Department of Insurance, 215 F.3d
526, 534 (2000), rehearing denied, 220 F.3d 641 (2000), vacated in part on other
grounds, sub nom., Montemayor v. Corporate Health Insurance, 536 U.S. 935 (2002),
found that THCLA was primarily directed toward health care treatment decisions
and only incidentally directed toward administration of insurance coverage.
Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins., 215 F.3d 526, 534 (5th Cir. 2000),
rehearing and rehearing en banc denied, 220 F.3d 641 (5th Cir. 2000), vacated in part on
other grounds, sub nom., Montemayor v. Corporate Health Ins., 536 U.S. 935 (2002).
Thus, it held, THCLA was not related to ERISA-covered plans for purposes of
ERISA § 514(a). If THCLA were deemed not even to "relate to" an ERISA-covered
plan, of course, that would be all the more reason to find it was not completely
preempted. Id.
213. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
214. This disregards the “deemer clause.” See supra notes 202-03 and
accompanying text regarding the deemer clause.
215. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 88.001-.003 (West 2004); see supra note
203.
216. See KAHP, 538 U.S. at 329; Rush Prudential HMO, 536 U.S. at 363-64.
217. KAHP, 538 U.S. at 338.
218. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002(a) (Vernon 1997).
219. Rush Prudential HMO, 536 U.S. at 366-67.
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KAHP requirement as well because THCLA mandates that
managed care entities, rather than insureds, must incur the tort
damages that ensue from insurers’ failure to exercise ordinary care
220
when making health care treatment decisions.
Because the
statute shifts this risk between the parties, THCLA should fall
within the KAHP criteria for the insurance savings clause.
If the plans are underwritten by an employer rather than an
insurance carrier, the deemer clause is construed to exempt health
221
insurance plans from the insurance savings clause.
In such
situations, an insurance company may provide administrative
services for the plan, but benefit payments come from the
employer’s resources. If the health insurance plan is funded by an
222
insurance company, then the deemer clause does not apply.
Davila/Calad was decided under the four corners of the
pleadings, and neither the Calad complaint nor the Davila
complaint alleged whether it was the employer or the insurance
company who funded the health plan. Because such allegation is
extraneous to a cause of action under THCLA (and, in general, the
funding source would probably not even be known to a plaintiff at
the time of filing a complaint), there would be no basis for
assuming employer funding. In any event, Aetna, in its Supreme
Court brief, stated that it had funded Mr. Davila’s health insurance
223
policy.
Accordingly, the deemer clause did not apply in this
lawsuit, and the insurance savings clause should have saved the
claim from preemption, complete or otherwise.
c.

Reconsideration of the Procedural Holding

As previously suggested, the main argument against the
Court’s procedural holding comes from the specific language of
224
ERISA section 514. Whether the insurance savings clause is read
broadly or narrowly, and regardless of the scope of the deemer
clause, the insurance savings clause must mean something.
Congress has made the announcement explicitly: if a state law

220. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002(a).
221. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 746-47 (1985).
222. See id.
223. Brief for Petitioner Aetna Health Inc. at 6-7, Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila,
124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004) (No. 02-1845). The CIGNA brief did not indicate who
funded the Calad plan benefits. See Brief for Petitioner CIGNA Healthcare of
Texas, Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004) (No. 03-83).
224. See supra note 195-99 and accompanying text.
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regulates insurance (however that term is defined), then, subject to
225
the limitations of the deemer clause, ERISA does not invalidate it.
This point, by itself, should dispose of the Davila/Calad
procedural holding. The Court found that Congress intended so
thoroughly to occupy the area of law covered by a beneficiary’s
right to seek redress against an employer-sponsored health
insurance plan that no state law in this area could possibly stand.
Nothing in the language of the insurance savings clause, however,
remotely suggests that Congress intended to exclude any category
of state laws that regulate insurance from its ambit, even if those
laws might expand on the remedies specified under section
226
502(a).
To say, as the Court did, that no state remedial statute
could possibly be saved is simply to discard the language of the
insurance savings clause.
d.

The Davila/Calad Rationale

The Davila/Calad decision never determined whether THCLA
was a law that regulates insurance. The Court simply concluded
227
The
that the insurance savings clause argument “is unavailing.”
Court cited two previous decisions for the proposition that
228
Congress intended the ERISA section 502(a) remedies to be
229
Citing Pilot Life Insurance Co v. Dedeaux, the Court
exclusive.
stated that “the policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain
remedies and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme
would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and
beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that
230
Congress rejected in ERISA.”
The Court refused to acknowledge that Congress had not
rejected all state law remedies under ERISA, as it had specifically
saved state laws that regulate insurance. Similarly, the Court did
not explain why validation of state insurance laws which allow tort
liability for negligent denial of plan benefits would “completely
undermine” the federal scheme. Rather than establish a principled
basis for discarding the insurance savings clause, the Court relied

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000).
ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132.
Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2500.
ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132.
Id.
Id. at 2495 (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 418 U.S. 41, 54 (1987)).
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231

on circular reasoning.
Specific statutory language was not to be
the indicium of Congressional intent in this case because earlier
decisions had stated that such language would not be
determinative.
In other interpretations of ERISA’s preemption effects, the
Court has repeatedly reconsidered, and at times rightly rejected,
232
the language and rationale of prior opinions.
This area of the
law is so important that the Court subordinated stare decisis to the
public need for a fair and understandable reading of the ERISA
statute. In Davila/Calad, though, the Court defeated a specific
Congressional directive. Although the Court ruled consistently
with some of its earlier decisions, it undermined much of its own
progress.
2.

Policy Considerations

The Davila/Calad holding precluded all but the ERISAprescribed remedies for the vast majority of employee benefit
plans. Rejection of specific statutory language is reason enough to
question the decision. However, while statutory language is
233
generally the sine qua non of Congressional intent, legislative
construction may also be guided by the overall structure and
234
objects of the law.
It is worthwhile, therefore, to consider the
practical consequences of the substantive Davila/Calad holding.
These consequences should be examined in light of the declared
Congressional policies that motivated ERISA and of the policy
considerations that the Court itself articulated.
a.

Strengthening and Broadening the Social Safety Net

The “Congressional findings and declaration of policy” set
forth in ERISA section 2, indicate concerns for “disclosure” of
231. See id.
232. See De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 814
(1997); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A.,
Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 334 (1997); N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
v. Travelers Ins., 514 U.S. 645, 649 (1995) (reconsidering the meaning of “relate
to” in ERISA §§ 514(a) and (b)); KAHP, 538 U.S. at 335; UNUM Life Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 364 (1999) (reformulating the scope of the insurance
savings clause).
233. See Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104 (1993) (citing Griffin v.
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982)).
234. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655; United States Nat'l. Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins.
Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 454-55 (1993).
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expected benefits to employees, “minimum standards . . . assuring
the equitable character of such plans,” and “responsibility” to the
beneficiaries of those charged with administering employee benefit
235
plans.
Consistent with ERISA’s primary focus on retirement
income security, section 2 speaks most directly to pension plans.
Nevertheless, it is certainly reasonable to expect that Congress, by
including welfare plans within ERISA’s coverage, wished to
enhance the principles of disclosure, equity, and administrative
responsibility for employer sponsored health insurance plans.
THCLA is a reasonable means for accomplishing those objectives.
THCLA section 88.002(d) specifies that it will not impose tort
liability on managed care plans for failure to provide treatment that
236
is not covered by the health care plan. Thus, managed care plans
have an incentive to disclose the treatment they will or will not
cover. For example, CIGNA could have posted a statement on its
web site that it will generally refuse to pay for more than one day’s
hospital stay following a hysterectomy, and Aetna could likewise
have posted the details of its prescription drug formulary and steptherapy program. The HMOs could have also posted a general
statement that their internal determinations of appropriate
medical treatment could in some cases lead to a lower standard of
health care than might be recommended by the members’ treating
physicians. If these coverage restrictions were clearly disclosed to
the employer and the plan beneficiaries before they purchased
health insurance, the HMOs would have had a clear defense to the
THCLA claims under the Davila and Calad scenarios.
Likewise, THCLA promotes equity in plan coverage decisions
by providing that a managed care plan which fails to exercise
ordinary care when making health care treatment decisions will pay
the resulting damages to those plan beneficiaries harmed by such
237
failure. THCLA also promotes responsibility in health insurance
238
plan administrators. ERISA section 502(a) remedies for wrongful
coverage denials in the Davila and Calad situations are essentially
non-existent. Under those remedies, CIGNA could be required to
pay Calad the cost of an extra day’s stay in the hospital, and Aetna
could be required to pay Davila the cost of a few weeks’ supply of
Vioxx. These contract remedies, of course, bear almost no
235.
236.
237.
238.

ERISA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (a)-(b) (2000).
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002(d) (Vernon 1997).
Id. § 88.002(a).
ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
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239

relationship to the personal injuries suffered.
In a more general sense, THCLA might broaden and
strengthen the social safety net. It would encourage HMOs to be
more cognizant of those members, such as Davila and Calad, who
might not meet standard patient profiles. It would make it more
likely that medically vulnerable persons are given care that is
suitable for their needs. It would also ensure that when people are
injured because of negligent medical necessity decisions, the
burdens arising from those injuries can be spread among a broad
population base.
The arguments for extra-contractual remedies against health
insurers are similar to but, perhaps, stronger than the arguments
for extra-contractual remedies against any insurer in the non-HMO
context. Ordinarily, a dispute between an insured and an insurer
takes the form of an argument over money after the fact, with no
consequences other than who should have the money. The loss,
240
whatever it may be, is relatively fixed. With an HMO, the dispute
is generally over prospective care. The potential consequences to
the insured are partly financial but may also include injury to
health, or even to life, resulting from a deprivation of necessary
medical care.
At the same time, though, substantial arguments can be made
against the imposition of tort liability for an improper denial of
health insurance coverage. THCLA seeks to impose an objective
241
“ordinary care” or “ordinary prudence” standard of liability.
On
its face, this seems reasonable enough. In practice, however, the
application of the law to a specific fact situation will depend on the
judicial process. While that process may support goals of social
equity, it will also engender significant monetary and other costs
for those involved. Tort litigation is a spectacularly expensive and
inefficient undertaking, and it might be worthwhile for the health
care system to suffer a modest level of inequity if doing so would
avoid those costs.
Reasonable doubts could be raised about the inherent fairness
239. Presumably, although not necessarily, CIGNA and Aetna had to bear most
or all of the medical bills resulting from their alleged failure to exercise
reasonable care. The injuries suffered by Davila and Calad, however, went far
beyond the cost of their medical treatment. See Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2493.
240. 16A JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §
8878 (1981) (pointing out that any delay in receipt of insurance proceeds is likely
to cause some accretion of the loss).
241. See supra Part I.C.
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of a jury verdict in a case brought against a health insurance
company by those who have suffered serious medical injuries. In
the Davila and Calad situations, the members’ physicians
recommended treatments based primarily on their patients’
welfare. There is no simple way to ascertain the regard they had
for the financial burdens associated with their recommendations.
The HMOs, on the other hand, gave substantial weight to the costs
of the proposed treatments. They may have determined that the
physicians’ recommendations were medically desirable but not
strictly medically necessary. From the position of society as a whole,
this is a reasonable way of allocating medical resources. Viewing
the matter with hindsight, however, a jury might be disinclined to
defer to the HMOs’ judgments. The situation invites a prejudicial
verdict.
Plan sponsors might be unwilling to bear these
uncertainties and might decline to provide their employees with
health insurance. Thus, THCLA could have the undesired effect of
actually shrinking the social safety net.
Also, in most circumstances patients could pay for the medical
care the HMO denied them and then sue for reimbursement of the
242
costs under ERISA. Mrs. Calad’s physician should have explained
to her the basis for his recommendation that she spend an extra
day in the hospital, and Mr. Davila’s physician should have
explained to him why he thought Vioxx was a more appropriate
243
medication than Naprosyn.
Unless the patients were completely
devoid of financial resources, they could have followed their
physicians’ advice, paid for the medical care out of their own
244
pockets, and then sued for the wrongfully denied coverage.
While patients who buy insurance coverage to protect against
medical bills may feel imposed upon when their reasonable
payment requests are denied, it is not irrational to expect them to
mitigate their damages. Thus, the injuries of Calad and Davila may
242. ERISA § 502(g)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (providing for the recovery of
attorneys’ fees in such a suit, within the court's discretion).
243. Under the AMA Code of Medical Ethics, physicians are required to inform
their patients of the benefits, risks, and costs of appropriate treatment alternatives.
AM. MED. ASS’N, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL
AFFAIRS, E-10.01, (issued June 1992, updated 1993), at http://www.amaassn.org/ama/noindex /category/11760.html.
244. One study found that among elderly patients with osteoarthritis, the
strongest predictor of Cox-2 inhibitor drug usage was the patient's insurance
coverage rather than clinical criteria. Jalpa A. Doshi et al., The Impact of Drug
Coverage on COX-2 Inhibitor Use in Medicare, HEALTH AFFAIRS (2004), at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/ hlthaff.w4.94v1?ck=nck.
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have resulted partly from their personal decisions as well as from
the HMOs’ decisions.
In the abstract then, the reasons for allowing tort liability
against HMOs are countered by equally weighty reasons for
disallowing such liability.
Whether, in practice, the policy
considerations would remain in balance, or whether one set of
principles would be seen to predominate over the other cannot be
known except through experience.
The federalist structure of American government is well-suited
to handle such issues. If there is no consensus on a problem of
legal economics, the matter can be left to the states. One state may
try one solution, and another state may try a different solution.
Each state’s government represents and is responsible to its own
245
citizens.
With experience, a consensus may emerge as to what is the
most desirable solution to a social problem, and most, or even all,
states may adopt that consensus solution. Alternatively, what may
be found desirable in one state might be rejected in another, and
the state laws may disagree. If there is such disagreement, each
state will have chosen the laws that it deems, rightly or wrongly, best
suited for its own governance. As the oft-quoted dissent in New
246
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann puts the matter: “It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
247
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”
As a general matter, there is little uniformity among state
insurance laws about the scope of the insured’s remedies in the
non-HMO context for wrongful coverage denials. Some states
248
simply allow ordinary contract damages, others allow an element
249
250
of punitive damages,
and others have other remedies.
Congress was undoubtedly aware of this variation among state
insurance laws when it enacted ERISA. Through the insurance
savings clause, it endorsed their application of state insurance laws
to plans covered under ERISA.
The Davila/Calad holding precludes a federalist experiment
245. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 920 (1997).
246. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
247. Id. at 311. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
248. APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 240, § 8878.15.
249. Id. § 8878.65.
250. Id. §§ 8878.35 (consequential damages), 8878.55 (damages for mental
and emotional distress).
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on remedies against HMOs. States may not test and compare the
benefits and disadvantages of tort liability statutes or other types of
remedies. States must accept the ERISA section 502 remedies as
exclusive. Davila/Calad undercuts one of the significant strengths
of the American form of government—a strength that is welldesigned to address the very problems that motivated ERISA’s
passage.
b.

National Uniformity

Congress, by enacting ERISA, federalized the law applying to
employee benefit plans to in order to reduce or eliminate some of
the disuniformities that would otherwise force national plans
251
entering into local markets to purchase insurance.
Thus, if a
nationwide employer with employees in a state with a THCLA-type
statute wished to establish an HMO for its employees, the employer
would have to provide a somewhat different mix of benefits to its
employees on a state by state basis. Specifically, employees in states
with THCLA-type laws would be entitled to tort remedies for
breach of promised health care benefits, whereas employees in
states without such laws would not have these rights. Employers
might find the inability to provide a uniform benefits package to be
a disincentive to the creation of the welfare plan. It might
therefore be argued that enforcement of THCLA would undercut a
principal purpose of ERISA—encouragement of employersponsored benefit plans.
The problem with this argument is that it simply reads the
insurance savings clause out of ERISA. In Metropolitan Life Insurance
252
Co. v. Massachusetts, the Court stated:
We also are aware that [Metropolitan Life’s] construction
of the statute would eliminate some of the disuniformities
currently facing national plans that enter into local
markets to purchase insurance. Such disuniformities,
however, are the inevitable result of the congressional
decision to “save” local insurance regulation. Arguments
as to the wisdom of these policy choices must be directed
253
at Congress.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly employed the insurance
251. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.,
514 U.S. 645, 656-58 (1995).
252. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
253. Id. at 747.
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savings clause to enforce state laws that effectively require
254
nationwide employers to provide non-uniform national benefits.
Logically, the advantages of national uniformity should yield to the
force of the insurance savings clause when it comes to remedial
measures, just as the advantages of national uniformity have yielded
to the insurance savings clause in other areas of insurance
regulation.
c.

Upsetting the Regulatory Applecart

The Davila/Calad opinion observes:
Congress enacted ERISA to protect . . . the interests of
participants in employee benefit plans and their
beneficiaries by setting out substantive regulatory
requirements for employee benefit plans and to provid[e]
for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to
the Federal courts. The purpose of ERISA is to provide a
uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit plans.
To this end, ERISA includes expansive pre-emption
255
provisions . . . .
From this premise, the opinion concludes that the section 502
remedies are part of a “uniform regulatory regime,” and are
“essential to accomplish Congress’ purpose of creating a
comprehensive statute for the regulation of employee benefit
256
plans.”
The problem with this argument is that it may hold true for
pension plans, but it does not apply to welfare plans. ERISA
regulates the procedural standards and content of pension plans
closely. While ERISA provides similar procedural safeguards for
257
welfare plans, it does not regulate their substantive content at all.
As applied to welfare plans, then, ERISA cannot be fairly deemed
258
“a comprehensive statute despite the Court’s assertions.”
The insurance savings clause provides a mechanism for filling
254. E.g., id. (mental health benefits); KAHP, 538 U.S. at 341-42 (access to any
qualified provider willing to enter into the insurance carrier’s provider panel
contract); Rush Prudential HMO Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002) (acceptance
of medical necessity determinations by an independent physician—one not on the
HMO panel of physicians).
255. 124 S. Ct. at 2495 (inner quotation marks and statutory citations
omitted).
256. Id.
257. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts., 471 U.S. 724, 732 (1985).
258. See Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2495.
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the regulatory gap ERISA has left uncovered—state insurance laws.
Such laws have been commonplace since well before the enactment
259
of ERISA.
Thus, the fairest reading of ERISA, both from the
language of the statute and the historical perspective, is that
employer-sponsored health insurance policies were to be regulated
by a conjunction of state and federal laws. From this viewpoint, a
rule that invalidates those state remedial laws which regulate the
insurance industry has the effect of upsetting the overall regulatory
260
scheme. The Court’s conclusion, that “the federal scheme would
be completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and
beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that
261
Congress rejected in ERISA,” does not stand up.
3. Comparison of the Language of ERISA with the Language of
LMRA
Davila/Calad emphasized “the similarity of the language used
in [LMRA] and ERISA” to justify the Avco complete preemption
262
doctrine in the ERISA section 502(a) context.
The Court cited
263
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor to support its statement.
Taylor, in turn, said that the “closely parallel” language was to be
264
found in ERISA section 502(f) and LMRA section 301(a).
ERISA section 502(f) states that “[t]he district courts of the
United States shall have jurisdiction, without respect to the amount
in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to grant the relief
provided for in subsection (a) of this section [ERISA section
265
502(a)] in any action.”
LMRA section 301(a) states:
(a) Venue, amount, and citizenship. Suits for violation of
contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such
labor organizations, may be brought in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
259. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 742 (1985).
260. Id. at 750.
261. Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2495 (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987)).
262. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int’l Assoc. of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
263. Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct at 2495.
264. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 59 (1987).
265. ERISA § 502(f), 29 U.S.C. §1132(f) (2000).
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without respect to the amount in controversy or without
266
regard to the citizenship of the parties.
There is nothing remarkable about the language of either
statute. They are both simple affirmations that the district courts of
the United States are to have non-exclusive jurisdiction over certain
controversies, based on ERISA and LMRA, respectively. There is
no particular or distinctive “similarity” or “closely parallel”
language between these two provisions.
4.

What Went Wrong: Pilot Life and Taylor

The problem, which has come to a boil in Davila/Calad, began
with the murky language of ERISA itself. First, the title refers to
retirement income, while the case itself had nothing to do with
retirement or income. Clearly, the statute covers more than the
title suggests. While the misnomer does not diminish the force of
267
the law, it does demonstrate that Congressional thinking was
focused outside the realm of welfare benefits.
Second, the unvarnished language of the primary provision on
preemption, ERISA section 514(a), is self-contradictory. According
to section 514(a), state laws “insofar as they may now or hereafter
268
relate to any employee benefit plan” are to be preempted. As the
Supreme Court ultimately observed, everything in some degree
relates to everything else, so all state laws relate to employee benefit
plans in some measure. Clearly, Congress was not suggesting a
wholesale overthrow of state law. To imply some limitation on the
literal language of the statute and give it sense the Court’s current
holdings read the quoted language as though the word
269
“reasonably” was before the word “relate.” The problem, though,
is that it took time for the Court to wrestle with the section 514(a)
language in various contexts, before it ultimately concluded a
dictionary meaning was not appropriate. While the jurisprudential
transformation was taking place, older precedents, based at least in
part on discarded analysis, were left standing.

266. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2000).
267. In cases of doubt, the title of a statute can shed light on its meaning.
Almondarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998).
268. ERISA § 514(a), 24 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
269. De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997);
Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Const., N.A., Inc., 519
U.S. 316 (1997); N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins., 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
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The language of the other key preemption provision, the
insurance savings clause, is also a factor. In Metropolitan Life
270
Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, the Court observed that “the saving
clause appears broadly to preserve the States’ lawmaking power
over much of the same regulation [that Congress had preempted
with section 514(a)]. While Congress occasionally decides to
return to the States what it has previously taken away, it does not
271
Thus, the Court
normally do both at the same time.”
simultaneously had to reconcile the imprecise wording of section
514(a) with the equally imprecise language of the insurance savings
272
clause. As indicated above, the struggle to hit this moving target
led to varying formulations of the insurance savings clause.
As a way out of this morass, the Court turned to the legislative
history of ERISA. Here, too, it initially found little assistance. In
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts it noted:
There is no discussion in that history of the relationship
between the general pre-emption clause [section 514(a)]
and the saving clause, and indeed very little discussion of
the saving clause at all . . . . [There is no] indication in
the legislative history that Congress . . . was aware that the
saving clause was in conflict with the general pre-emption
273
provision.
Although the legislative history seemed so unclear in 1985,
when Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts was decided, it
suddenly became transparent to the Court in 1987, when it decided
274
two companion cases, Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, and
275
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor.
Pilot Life arose out of a
276
disability insurance claim. Mr. Dedeaux had injured his back and
claimed long term disability benefits under an employer purchased
277
insurance policy with Pilot Life.
Pilot Life originally allowed the
claim, but it then repeatedly terminated and reinstated the
278
Eventually, Dedeaux brought a diversity action against
benefits.
Pilot Life in federal court, alleging three counts, all based solely on

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

471 U.S. 724 (1985).
Id. at 740.
See infra Part III.B.1.a.
421 U.S. at 745.
481 U.S. 41 (1987).
481 U.S. 58 (1987).
Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 41.
Id. at 43.
Id.
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state law: tortious breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties,
279
He sought, inter alia, punitive
and fraud in the inducement.
280
damages and damages for mental and emotional distress. He did
281
The trial court granted summary
not raise any ERISA claims.
judgment to Pilot Life, finding that all of Dedeaux’s claims had
282
been preempted.
The Court of Appeals reversed the district
court, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the
283
Court of Appeals.
Pilot Life observed that “the express pre-emption provisions of
ERISA are deliberately expansive and designed to establish pension
284
plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern.”
The Court
went on to quote Congressional sponsors of ERISA, to the effect
that the law is “intended to preempt the field for Federal
285
regulations.” It then held, based on the “expansive sweep of the
pre-emption clause,” that Dedeaux’s suit came within the “relate
286
to” language of section 514(a).
Next, Pilot Life turned to the insurance savings clause. It
looked at several criteria for interpreting that clause, including a
“common-sense view” of the statutory language, and it found that
287
the laws asserted in the complaint did not regulate insurance.
288
Thus, the suit was not saved from preemption.
Then, the Court went on to say that any state law that purports
to establish a remedy other than as set forth in ERISA section
502(a) would have to be preempted. It based this conclusion partly
on its determination that section 502(a) was intended to be “a
289
comprehensive civil enforcement scheme,” and partly on the
following language from the Congressional Conference Report on
ERISA:
Under the conference agreement, civil actions may be
brought by a participant or beneficiary to recover benefits
due under the plan, to clarify rights to receive future
benefits under the plan, and for relief from breach of
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Id.
Id. at 43-44.
Id. at 44.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 45-46 (inner quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 46 (inner quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 47.
Id. at 50-51.
Id. at 48-50.
Id. at 54.
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fiduciary responsibility . . .. [W]ith respect to suits to
enforce benefit rights under the plan or to recover
benefits under the plan which do not involve application
of the title I provisions, they may be brought not only in
U.S. district courts but also in State courts of competent
jurisdiction. All such actions in Federal or State courts are to be
regarded as arising under the laws of the United States in similar
fashion to those brought under section 301 of the Labor290
Management Relations Act of 1947.
The Court also quoted a similar comment by Senator Williams,
plus other, less pointed observations in the legislative record
concerning the desirability of having questions concerning
291
employee benefit plans be resolved without recourse to state law.
None of these legislative record quotations referred to the
insurance savings clause.
It is unclear from Pilot Life whether the Court intended to say
that a state law that falls squarely within the insurance savings
clause should be preempted notwithstanding the language of the
Insurance Savings Clause or whether the Court was merely
supporting a conclusion that the insurance savings clause should be
read narrowly. What the Court did say was that it divined a “clear
expression of congressional intent that ERISA’s civil enforcement
292
scheme be exclusive.”
No mention was made that, when
Congress was discussing preemption issues, it had not focused on
the effect of the insurance savings clause. More significantly, no
mention was made that the Pilot Life Court’s reasoning required
that a Congressional report be accorded more force than the
statutory language itself.
293
Taylor relied heavily on the Pilot Life rationale.
It, too, was a
claim for disability insurance benefits, although it also alleged
294
claims unrelated to an employee benefit plan.
It asserted only
295
Unlike Pilot Life (but like
state law causes of action.
296
The
Davila/Calad), the case was brought in state court.
defendants removed the case to federal court, and the district court

290. Id. at 55 (quoting H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280 at 327 (1974) (emphasis
in Court opinion but not in original document)).
291. Id. at 56.
292. Id. at 57.
293. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62-65 (1987).
294. Id.
295. Id. at 60.
296. Id. at 61.
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297

granted them summary judgment on the merits.
The court of
appeals reversed the district court on the grounds that it lacked
298
removal jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court then reversed, quoting the same language of
299
the Congressional Conference Report that Pilot Life had quoted.
The Taylor court noted that “[i]n the absence of explicit
300
direction from Congress, this question would be a close one.”
However, the Conference Report, along with the supposedly
“closely parallel” language of ERISA section 502(f) and LMRA
301
section 301(a), was determinative.
Neither Pilot Life nor Taylor addressed a law, like THCLA, that
fell specifically within the insurance savings clause.
The
Davila/Calad decision could have distinguished these two earlier
holdings on that basis. Considering the sweeping language of Pilot
Life and Taylor, though, the better course would probably have
been a complete disavowal of the errant language (and, perhaps in
the case of Taylor, the actual holding). If Pilot Life and Taylor are to
be read, as Davila/Calad ultimately did, as holding that language in
the legislative record should be given more force than the language
of the insurance savings clause, then those holdings were in error.
The Court has often observed that reliance on legislative
history to divine congressional intent is “a step to be taken
302
303
cautiously,”
which, as often as not, “muddies the waters.”
Individual members of the Court have expressed differing views
regarding the role that legislative history should play in statutory
interpretation. Justice Rehnquist has opined that “the legislative
304
history of a statute is a useful guide to the intent of Congress,”
whereas Justice Scalia has found legislative history to be “unreliable
305
. . . as a genuine indicator of congressional intent.” At minimum,
though, the courts should not base their decisions solely on
306
legislative history, without “[a] statutory reference point.”
Here, there was no such reference point. The insurance

297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id. at 61-62.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 65-66.
Id. at 64.
See analysis supra Part III.B.3.
Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 26 (1977).
United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997).
County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 182 (1981) (dissenting).
Wis. Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 617 (1991) (concurring).
Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 584 (1994).
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savings clause—“nothing in this title shall be construed to exempt
or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates
307
insurance”—is unambiguous.
It makes no exception for private
enforcement actions, and nothing in the quotations on which Pilot
Life and Taylor relied suggests statutory language that might
reasonably give rise to such an exception.
In all likelihood, the congressional statements, including those
in the Conference Report, suggesting a parallel between LMRA
preemption and ERISA preemption, were geared toward the
preemption of laws that might affect pension plans, rather than
308
those laws that might affect welfare plans.
As Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts noted, Congress, during its debates,
309
gave little regard to the insurance savings clause.
To find, then,
that Congress intended to limit its scope in the area of private
enforcement actions is an unfounded stretch.
But even if the authors of the Conference Report and the
various other Congressmen quoted in Metropolitan Life and in Taylor
were thinking squarely about the effect of the Insurance Savings
Clause on welfare plans, it should not matter. Congress votes on
legislation as written, not on the wording of debates or of
310
explanatory reports. “It is the function of the courts, and not the
311
Legislature . . . to say what an enacted statute means.”
In other situations, the Court has found language similar to
that of the insurance savings clause to be sufficiently clear as to
foreclose consideration of the legislative record. In Norfolk &
312
Western Railway Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway Carmen, the statute
provided that a railroad carrier “is exempt from the antitrust laws
and from all other law, including State and municipal law, as
313
necessary [to let the carrier carry out certain defined functions].”
The Court noted that the language was “clear, broad, and
unqualified” and refused to consider whether the Congressional
record might suggest that Congress intended the exemption
307. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 24 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1998).
308. The Court has itself observed that statements made during the legislative
process, “unless very precisely directed to the intended meaning of particular
words in a statute, can seldom be expected to be as precise as the enacted
language itself.” Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 237 (1984).
309. 471 U.S. 724, 745 (1985).
310. Am. Hosp. Assoc. v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 616 (1991).
311. NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 582
(1994).
312. 499 U.S. 117 (1991).
313. Id. at 119 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 11341(a)).
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314

applied only to certain classes of laws and not others.
315
Similarly, in United States v. Gonzales, the Court considered a
section of the criminal code that says that if a person is sentenced
to prison for drug trafficking while using or carrying a firearm the
“term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection
[shall not] run concurrently with any other term of
316
imprisonment.” The Court found the phrase “any other term of
imprisonment” to be unambiguous and not reasonably susceptible
317
to meaning only federal prison sentences. It therefore found no
reason to resort to legislative history, even if that history might
318
suggest otherwise.
The insurance savings clause is equally comprehensive and
unsusceptible to inferred exceptions. Pilot Life and Taylor should
not have considered legislative history which undid the
unambiguous statutory language. Moreover, if the standard
needed to justify complete preemption was a finding of “clear”
legislative intent, Pilot Life and Taylor were even more egregious.
Unfortunately, the Davila/Calad Court missed the opportunity to
acknowledge the slender foundations that underlay complete
preemption and disavow the language or, if necessary, the holdings
319
of those cases.
IV. THE LOWER COURTS’ RATIONALES — EFFORTS BY THE RISING
JUDICIAL CHORUS TO FIND AN EXCEPTION FOR MIXED ELIGIBILITY
AND TREATMENT DECISIONS
As observed at Part II.C, three circuits of the United States
Court of Appeals (the Second, Fifth, and Eleventh) and one state
supreme court (Pennsylvania) attempted to find tort liability for

314. Id. at 128.
315. 520 U.S. 1 (1997).
316. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) (2000).
317. Gonzales, 520 U.S. at 5.
318. Id. at 6.
319. Davila/Calad also cited Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S.
355 (2002) for the proposition that Congress intended to create an exclusive
remedy in ERISA § 502(a). Davila/Calad, 124 S. Ct. at 2500. Rush Prudential,
however, held that a state law requiring external review of medical necessity
decisions did not create a remedy of the sort prohibited under Pilot Life and Taylor.
Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 536 U.S. at 373-74 (2002). In dictum, it said that if it
had to address such a law, Pilot Life and Taylor would require that it be preempted.
Id. at 375-79. Even in dictum, Rush Prudential did not add to the force of the
arguments that underlay Pilot Life and Taylor; it merely repeated them. Id.
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320

“mixed eligibility and treatment decisions.”
The reason for such
approach is not hard to surmise. The lower courts were dissatisfied
with a jurisprudence that left such a large gap in the regulatory
structure of employer sponsored health insurance plans. No
matter how dissatisfied the lower courts may have been with that
jurisprudence, however, it was outside their purview to rewrite the
Supreme Court’s interpretation on a matter of federal law.
Therefore, they looked for an alternative way to reach the desired
result.
That alternative seemed to be the Court’s pronouncement in
321
Pegram v. Herdrich that HMO coverage decisions involving issues
of mixed eligibility and treatment fell outside ERISA’s fiduciary
322
liability requirements. Such decisions, under this reading, would
not be deemed to “relate to” the employee benefit plan itself and, if
the Court concurred, would never impinge upon either the general
323
preemption requirement of section 514(a)
or the complete
preemption doctrine of Pilot Life and Taylor. The Fifth Circuit did
not attempt to invoke the insurance savings clause argument,
because to do so would have violated its obligation to adhere to
324
binding Supreme Court rulings.
The other circuits and the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania could not even have considered
the insurance savings clause, as they did not have before them a
state law that might have come within its scope. Even those judges
who felt unable to stretch the Pegram dictum sufficiently far as to
allow recovery of tort damages acknowledged the need to change
325
the law. Ultimately, the Supreme Court denied the attempt to fit
Davila/Calad within this concept, as it would have required an
essentially new reading of ERISA, not mandated by the statutory
326
language itself.
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, however, joined
327
“the rising judicial chorus” of dissatisfaction with the result.

320. See infra Part II.C.
321. 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
322. Id. at 229-30.
323. Id. at 231.
324. See generally Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2002)
(consolidated with Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila and CIGNA HealthCare of Tex.,
Inc. v. Calad).
325. E.g., DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 453-61 (3d Cir.
2003) (Becker, J., concurring); Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 106 (2d Cir. 2003)
(Calabresi, J., dissenting in part).
326. 124 S. Ct. at 2500-02.
327. Id. at 2503.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s doctrine of complete ERISA preemption
is unsatisfactory, but not because the damages of those who have
been injured by HMOs’ medical necessity decisions must
sometimes go uncompensated. Complete ERISA preemption is
unsatisfactory because it usurps constitutionally allocated powers of
co-equal branches of government. It limits state judiciaries’
authority to determine whether ERISA preempts their own state’s
laws. It encroaches on Congress’s prerogative to determine the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Most importantly, it deprives
state legislatures of their right to enact legislation to rectify the
economic imbalance between HMOs and their members.
Whether HMOs should bear tort liability for negligent medical
necessity decisions is a subject for debate, well suited for resolution
by varying state laws. ERISA, through its specific language and by
its overall structure, anticipates such resolution. To return to
Justice Brandeis —
There must be power in the states and the nation to
remould [sic], through experimentation, our economic
practices and institutions to met changing social and
economic needs . . .. To stay experimentation in things
social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of
the right to experiment may be fraught with serious
328
consequences to the nation.
The Supreme Court, largely by reasons of historical accident,
has failed to give a fair reading to the wording or to the objects and
purposes of ERISA. The issue of tort liability against HMOs has
been taken from its proper forum, the state legislatures, and any
reform must come through Congress—decidedly the wrong forum.

328.

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
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EXHIBIT A
ERISA §502(a)
Civil Enforcement
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action. A civil action
may be brought—
(1) by a participant or beneficiary—(A) for the relief provided
for in subsection (c) of this section, or (B) to recover benefits due
to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the
terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under
the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or
fiduciary for appropriate relief under section 409 [29 U.S.C.S. §
1109];
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any
act or practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms
of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i)
to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this
title or the terms of the plan;
(4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for
appropriate relief in the case of a violation of 105I [29 U.S.C.S. §
1025I];
(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), by the
Secretary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any
provision of this title, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable
relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce any provision of
this title;
(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under
paragraph (2), (4), (5), (6), or (7) of subsection I or under
subsection (i) or (l);
(7) by a State to enforce compliance with a qualified medical
child support order (as defined in section 609(a)(2)(A) [29
U.S.C.S. § 1169(a)(2)(A)]);
(8) by the Secretary, or by an employer or other person
referred to in section 101(f)(1) [29 U.S.C.S. § 1021(f)(1)], (A) to
enjoin any act or practice which violates subsection (f) of section
101 [29 U.S.C.S. § 1021(f)], or (B) to obtain appropriate equitable
relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce such
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subsection; or
(9) in the event that the purchase of an insurance contract or
insurance annuity in connection with termination of an
individual’s status as a participant covered under a pension plan
with respect to all or any portion of the participant’s pension
benefit under such plan constitutes a violation of part 4 of this title
[subtitle] or the terms of the plan, by the Secretary, by any
individual who was a participant or beneficiary at the time of the
alleged violation, or by a fiduciary, to obtain appropriate relief,
including the posting of security if necessary, to assure receipt by
the participant or beneficiary of the amounts provided or to be
provided by such insurance contract or annuity, plus reasonable
prejudgment interest on such amounts.
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EXHIBIT B
Excerpts from ERISA §514(a) and (b)
Effect on Other Laws
(a) Supersedure. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section, the provisions of this title and title IV shall supersede any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan described in section 4(a) [29 U.S.C.S. §
1003(a)] and not exempt under section 4(b) [29 U.S.C.S. §
1003(b)].
(b) Construction and application.
(2) (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in
this title shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from
any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or
securities.
(B) Neither an employee benefit plan described in section
4(a) [29 U.S.C.S. § 1003(a)], which is not exempt under section
4(b) [29 U.S.C.S. § 1003(b)] (other than a plan established
primarily for the purpose of providing death benefits), nor any
trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an
insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or
investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance
or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to
regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust
companies, or investment companies.
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